1989; McAllister, 1996!, persuasion~Hillygus and Shields, 2009; Zaller, 1992 !, and priming~Iyengar et al., 1984 , 1987 Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Mendelsohn, 1996; Miller and Krosnick, 2000!. We use the 2011 Canadian Election Study~CES! to evaluate the empirical validity of these accounts of the "orange wave." Our goal here is to separate fact from fancy. We begin by reviewing the election's outcome, exploring just how much aggregate opinion change occurred, and where. Then we sketch a picture of campaign dynamics and key moments, using a combination of CES data and media content analyses. This is followed by an individual-level analysis of CES data. Models of vote choice and turnover from 2008 to 2011 are used to uncover who exactly changed their minds and to identify the factors and motivations that led to the unexpected electoral results of 2011. Table 1 presents the actual vote shares~from Elections Canada! received by the main political parties during the federal elections of 2008 and 2011 and the change between the two~indicated by the symbol D!. At the national level~see the last row!, two parties made gains among the electorate: the Conservatives were up very slightly~ϩ1.9 percentage points!, while the NDP expanded its support extensively~ϩ12.4 points!. The other three parties' shares of the vote declined. The Liberals lost the greatest number of votes~over 850,000!, and the Greens lost nearly half of their support. Most visible in lost seats, the Bloc Québécois was abandoned by close to 40 per cent of its former voters.
The 2011 Election
The regional story is one of relative homogeneity, at least in the rest of Canada~ROC!. The Conservatives made gains in every province except Quebec, though somewhat more in the East than in the West, where they were already strong. They finished first in all provinces except Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador, stealing the lead from the 2008 Liberals in two~Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island!. The New Democrats improved their standing in every province save Newfoundland and Labrador. NDP gains were rather uniform across the ROC and, what is probably more significant, the party finished second in every province except PEI. The Liberals, in contrast, lost support everywhere. They finished third or worse in eight out of ten provinces~the exceptions being PEI and Newfoundland and Labrador!. The Greens also lost ground in every single province.
Quebec is often distinctive in federal elections, of course, but the results of 2011 seem particularly dramatic in this regard-indeed, the most dramatic since the Bloc arrived on the scene in 1993. Only one 
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Official election results, source: Elections Canada rors to a great extent the Liberal one; steady for the first half of the campaign, with a slow rise starting at the halfway point, for about a 10-point gain overall.
In Quebec, shifts in vote intentions exhibited more amplitude and started earlier than in the ROC. The vague orange~orange wave! is indeed impressive, a swing of approximately 30 percentage points in 30 days. The NDP started the race in fourth place, exactly where it left off in 2008, with around 15 per cent of popular support. Nothing at the beginning of the campaign hinted at the historic breakthrough that was about to unfold. It is interesting to note that the orange surge occurred in three distinct stages. First, very early on, the NDP jumped to 25 per cent, from fourth to second place. NDP support then held steady for about two weeks before taking off again in mid-April, putting the NDP in the lead in Quebec for the first time ever. There was a slip in the NDP's vote share around April 23, but this was a temporary setback, as the wave gained power again in the last week of the campaign. The Bloc Québécois' line nearly mirrors the NDP's, at least until the final weeks when the NDP rise seems to be driven as much by diminishing support for the Conservatives and Liberals as by declining support for the Bloc. Ultimately, all three of these parties lost close to 10 percentage points in Quebec during the campaign, with apparently almost all of that going to the NDP.
Who changed their vote in this election? Table 2 cross-tabulates voters' choices in the two most recent federal elections, in the ROC and in Table 2 , it also suggests that Quebec deserves special attention. We turn to these tasks below, giving specific consideration to the possible explanations set out in the introduction. We start by exploring some of the most common propositions relating to campaign events.
The Campaign Events
This section focuses on the dynamics of vote intentions and media content, and explores the potential impact of campaign events. Vote intentions are illustrated in Figure 1 , above. For media content, we rely on data from a content analysis of all election-related stories in ten daily newspapers. 6 We focus on a very simple statistic: the daily proportion of "first mentions" for each of the parties0leaders. The "first mentions"-the leader or party mentioned first in an article-serve as a simple but valuable measure of the presence and prominence of parties and leaders in campaign coverage~Andrew et al., 2008; Daku et al., 2009 !. They also capture a degree of campaign framing. When a campaign is viewed mainly as a competition highlighting a single party, for instance, that party tends to receive first mentions even in articles that end up focusing on other parties. As a result, first mentions tend to be relatively strong predictors of campaign-period trends in vote shares and of electoral outcomes more generally. They have the added advantage of being an objective measure of campaign coverage, captured using automated content analysis in Lexicoder.
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Figure 2 displays trends in party0leader first mentions over the 2011 campaign. The Conservative party dominated coverage: in the ROC, roughly 60 per cent of all campaign-related stories mention either the Conservatives or Harper before any other party or leader; in Quebec, the Conservative share is lower but usually greater than any other party. That said, there are some important shifts and we use these below in conjunction with the data on vote intentions to explore the potential impact of campaign events on the final outcome.
Media commentators are often tempted to see campaign events as triggers of change. Indeed, some accounts of the orange wave noted above point towards such events~such as polling results, leaders' debates, and other events!. The evidence in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that several of them can be ruled out, however. In the aftermath of his resignation, Gilles Duceppe alleged that a bizarre outlier poll startled the Quebec electorate and pushed many into the arms of the NDP. It is not clear to which survey he was referring, but the most likely candidates are~a! the first polls placing the NDP in second place in the province~Angus Reid, Forum, and Ipsos on April 7!, or~b! the first polls putting the NDP in front in Quebec~CROP, Ekos, Forum and Ipsos on April 21!. In neither opinion nor media data do we see that these surveys produced marked shifts. The April 7 polls came in the midst of a plateau in NDP support that started around April 5, and the April 21 polls come in the middle~not the beginning! of a NDP increase. 8 The consistency exhibited by these polls and their compatibility with the CES estimates indicate that they were no flukes.
9 Furthermore, media content shows that both sets of polls came during lulls, not surges, in NDP coverage.
What about the leaders' debates? None of the media stories on the debates suggested that they were game-changers and our survey data are consistent with that impression. The debates of April 12 and 13 do coincide with an important shift in party support in ROC vote intentions. For instance, a t-test reveals that Conservative support in the four days prior to the English debate was significantly lower than support in the four days after. But, as is sometimes observed~Blais et al., 1996 observed~Blais et al., , 1999 observed~Blais et al., , 2003 !, this possible impact of debates was temporary; by April 17, vote shares in the ROC were just about where they were pre-debate. 10 In Quebec, on the other hand, the debates appear inconsequential: there is no significant difference in vote intentions for any party during the 8-to 14-day window spanning either side of the French debate. The fortunes of the NDP did lift off in Quebec starting on April 18, but that is five days after the French debate. Typically, when debates have had an impact, it has been instanta-neous, especially among debate viewers~Blais et al., 1996 viewers~Blais et al., , 1999 viewers~Blais et al., , 2003 In 2011, the debates do not line up with the second part of the orange surge in Quebec, even when we examine only debate viewers.
Other campaign events did coincide with the main shifts in aggregate vote intentions. As Figure 1 illustrates, the first phase of the NDP surge within Quebec begins on April 3, corresponding with Jack Layton's very successful appearance on Quebec's main talk show Tout le monde en parle. There is a statistically significant 8-point difference in NDP vote intentions when comparing the week before this appearance to the following week. This is a first sign that the NDP leader played an important role in the 2011 election results.
The second phase begins on April 18, when Bloc support starts to slip and NDP support starts to rise again. T-tests confirm that this point is a significant hinge in the unfolding of the campaign. Just one day earlier, on April 17, Gilles Duceppe stood with Parti Québécois leader Pauline Marois on the stage of a PQ convention and confidently asserted that the re-election of the Bloc would be followed quickly by the election of the PQ at the provincial level and a victory in a third referendum on sovereignty. Indeed, for the remainder of the campaign the Bloc continued to focus on sovereignty and to remind voters that the NDP is a federalist party, thus producing an explosion in sovereignty coverage over the last two weeks of the campaign. This is readily evident in Figure 3 , which shows the number of times sovereignty keywords were used in electionrelated articles over time.
11 The Bloc message might have been effective among diehard sovereignists in getting out the party's core vote, but it may well also have backfired among the more numerous soft nationalists who often support the Bloc in order to defend the interests of Quebec on the federal scene. Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that this emphasis on sovereignty may have pushed a significant number of voters in Quebec away from the Bloc Québécois, not just around April 17, but also during the third campaign phase beginning on April 26.
Consider the following. Before April 26, the NDP gains were stalled or, worse, collapsing, and some early Bloc deserters may have been trickling back to camp. After this date, New Democrats reached significantly higher levels, while the Bloc declined a bit further. This date is bracketed by controversial speeches from sovereignist leaders Jacques Parizeaũ April 25! and Gérald Larose~April 27!. These two speeches were part of a change in strategy aiming to rally the party's core sovereignist supporters back to the Bloc~Bélanger and Nadeau, 2011: 125!. This tactic may have caused more harm than good. In fact, the volume of coverage dedicated to the sovereignty issue in Figure 3 is linked to the evolution of NDP support over the last portion of the Quebec campaign, not only visually but also in time-series analysis. Sovereignty coverage spikes following the PQ convention, then falls, and then increases again at the time of the two speeches, exactly when the size of the NDP ranks swell and shrink.
Of course, we cannot be confident that these events had significant impacts based on the simple examination of these graphical displays alone. But, as we shall see in individual-level data analyses below, a combination of positive impressions of Layton and the exodus of nationalists from the Bloc to the NDP seems to have been critical.
Individual-Level Determinants of Vote Choice and Change
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of multinomial regression analyses of the 2011 voting decision. Since the nature of this choice is quite different in Quebec and the rest of Canada, the two regions are examined separately. The dependent variable is the reported vote from the post-election wave of the CES. To establish a baseline for comparison, the first set of columns in the tables provides regression results from the 2008 election. All models contain the same independent variables, measured identically.~The description of all variables is specified in the online appendix.! Inspired by previous accounts of vote choice in Canada~Blais et al., 2002; Gidengil et al., 2012; Nevitte et al., 2000 !, the explanatory vari- .55
Note: In the first two columns, entries are marginal effects of multinomial logit estimations, and the dependent variable is the post-election reported vote.
Marginal effects represent the average change in the probability of the dependent variable for all one-point movements of the independent variable. Contrary to MNL coefficients, they do not imply a reference category. The third column shows the significance of the difference between the first two columns~year D!. The fourth column shows the significance of the difference between the variable's impact on vote intentions during the first two weeks of the 2011 campaign and its impact during the last two weeks~campaign D!.
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Note: In the first two columns, entries are marginal effects of multinomial logit estimations, and the dependent variable is the post-election reported vote. Marginal effects represent the average change in the probability of the dependent variable for all one-point movements of the independent variable. Contrary to MNL coefficients, they do not imply a reference category. The third column shows the significance of the difference between the first two columns~year D!.
The fourth column shows the significance of the difference between the variable's impact on vote intentions during the first two weeks of the 2011 campaign and its impact during the last two weeks~campaign D!. In line with the tradition of block-recursive models of voting behaviour~Bélanger and Nadeau, 2009; Blais et al., 2002; Gidengil et al., 2012; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Nevitte et al., 2000 !, we estimate all models in a step-wise fashion, starting with demographics and adding each subsequent block~separated by headlines in the tables! in turn. All estimations rely on multinomial logit, appropriate for a categorical variable such as vote choice. Not all effects of each model are presented here, however. We only report the effects of a block when that block first enters, controlling for the anterior blocks, but excluding the posterior blocks. So the effects of demographic variables come from a model which includes demographics only; the effects of general orientation variables originate from a model that contains general orientations as well as the preceding demographic block; partisanship's effects take into account controls for general orientations and demographics; and so on. We do this based on the assumption that the ordering of blocks is linked to causal precedence and the stability of variables~see especially Miller and Shanks, 1996 !. The full results are available in the online appendix.
Note that our intention here is not to dissect in detail the effects of each factor on vote choice in 2008 and 2011. Future work may well do so; there is much worthy of further analysis in these tables. But our current aim is to identify the factors that can help explain why the outcomes of these two elections were so different, especially in Quebec. The analyses presented below are just those that are most useful for this specific purpose.
In order to highlight what we see as most critical to our storyline, we make several concessions. First, we present marginal effects rather than raw multinomial logistic coefficients. Marginal effects are more intuitive but also less comparable from one model to the next.~Issues related to marginal effects are discussed in Hanmer and Kalkan, 2013 .! Results below were confirmed using both raw coefficients and other transformations of these coefficients as well. Second, as noted above, we do not present all the results from each of the fourteen step-wise multinomial estimations on which our story relies; rather, we present only the most important effects. This means that we do not show instances in which a variable that is significant at an earlier stage in the estimation becomes insignificant at some later stage. 13 We do not regard this as problematic for our purposes since the central premise of the block-recursive approach is that the full estimate of a given variable's impact comes before causally posterior variables are added~which may well subsume that variable's impact!. But we readily admit that shifts in the significance of variables will be of real interest for those with objectives different than ours. Impor- tantly, then, we have included all the estimations in their entirety in the online appendix. That appendix also includes the syntax necessary to replicate these results from the publicly available 2011 CES file. We expect that other researchers will be interested in focusing on some of the results there. Here, we focus just on the rather broad picture of change.
Towards that end, we search below for vote determinants where there was either~a! a change in the distribution of opinion between 2008 and 2011, or~b! a change in the impact of a variable on vote choice between 2008 and 2011. Our assumption is as follows. In order for a variable to account for the differing election results, it needs to exhibit either a movement in its distribution or a modification of its effect; otherwise, that factor cannot explain the massive shift in party fortunes. For instance, evaluations of Jack Layton can only be responsible for the orange surge if Layton is much more popular in 2011, or if his ratings have much more weight on the 2011 voting calculus.
Evidence concerning the change in the effects of the variables is presented in Tables 3 and 4 . The marginal effects reported for the 2008 and 2011 elections are relatively straightforward, but we add two tests of the significance of differences in effects. The first test focuses on discrepancies between the two elections: the significance of the differences between the 2008 and 2011 marginal effects is shown in the third column for each party~year D!. These estimates are based on a model that pools the 2008 and 2011 data and includes interactive terms for all 2011 items. The second test focuses on divergences across the 2011 campaign: capturing the significance of the differences in marginal effects measured at the start and at the end of that campaign~the columns labelled campaign D!.
14 Because NDP support lifted off very early in the Quebec campaign and continued to move until very late, we cannot simply split the campaign halfway through. In a compromise between the desire to capture periods before and after the orange surge and the need to have a sufficient number of cases, we compare the first two weeks of the campaign to the last two weeks of the campaign~the eight days in the middle are excluded!. Again, this model relies on interactive terms to uncover the significance of differences in effects.
Evidence regarding changes in the distribution of each independent variable is displayed in Table 5 . It includes the mean for 2008 and 2011, the significance of the differences in means across the two elections~year D!, and the significance of the differences between the means during the campaign's beginning and those of the campaign's end~campaign D!.
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Finally, where appropriate, we also discuss below the results of regression analyses that model change in vote choice between 2008 and 2011. These specifications compare the supporters of a party that remained loyal to those who left, or alternatively the new supporters of a party to the older ones. Since they rely on few cases, especially in Quebec, their sta-tistical power is limited. 16 Nevertheless, these analyses occasionally pinpoint individuals who were significantly more likely to desert a particular political party or to rally to another.
Demographics
We capture basic demographics using a series of binary variables~see appendix!. Results in Table 3 suggest that the demographic profile of Conservative and Liberal supporters in the ROC did not change much between 2008 and 2011. 17 In both elections, the Conservatives had more success among westerners, whites, the less educated and non-unionized households. One notable difference between the two elections was the The profile of ROC NDP voters changed a great deal. In 2008, NDP supporters tended to be from Atlantic Canada and the West, female, younger, less educated and union members. In 2011, the New Democrats made gains in central Canada, among the middle-aged and male voters, as well as those with pre-university education, resulting in a more equally distributed popularity across various portions of the electorate. Only two significant differences persisted; NDP support was higher in the West than elsewhere, and higher among union households as well. It is also worth mentioning that the NDP obtained the support of a greater proportion of visible minorities in 2011, a group that generally favours the Liberals~Blais, 2005!. 18 In Quebec~Table 4!, vote choice was less determined by demographics, and the relationships did not change much between 2008 and 2011 despite wholesale changes in voting preferences. During both elections, the Bloc attracted fewer of the non-francophone voters. In 2011, the party managed to hold on to more university graduates. As in the ROC, the Conservative gender gap of 2008 disappeared in 2011. But during the last election, two significant relationships emerged: non-francophones and voters without a high school diploma were more likely to vote Conservative. The Liberal base was among non-francophones, but the party also had success in 2011 with citizens from non-union households. NDP support was higher among younger voters and non-francophones in 2008, but these relationships became insignificant three years later, as the NDP diversified the profile of its clientele. Only the more educated were markedly less prone to vote NDP in 2011.
Overall, there is not much material in the demographic results to explain the divergent outcomes of the two most recent federal elections in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. To make further headway in this direction, we need to examine people's attitudes.
General orientations
Next, we turn to general orientations-or values-with respect to political, economic, and social life~controlling for demographics!. We rely Outside Quebec, it is difficult to find differences between the two elections in the attitudinal correlates of support for each political partỹ see Table 3 !. The drivers of Conservative appeal were exactly the same in 2008 and 2011: the party attracted more votes among those with negative views about Quebec's demands, those who favour closer ties to the Unites States, those who prefer market liberalism, those with traditional attitudes about women and homosexuals, the politically satisfied, and those who think their province is treated fairly.
On all but one of the general orientations, the Conservative voters are on one side and the Liberal and NDP voters are together on the other side. In other words, these orientations, with the exception of market liberalism in 2011, do not distinguish Liberals from New Democrats. In both electoral contests, NDP and Liberal supporters tended to approve the accommodation of Quebec, to oppose closer links with Americans and moral traditionalism, and to be politically disaffected.
One difference is noteworthy. Citizens who prefer state intervention to unfettered capitalism split their votes in 2008 between Liberals and New Democrats, all else being equal, whereas in 2011 this value orientation pushed voters toward the NDP. Vote change models also show that new NDP voters in 2011 were more likely to be market liberals. The shift was consequential for the outcome. Simulations reveal that the NDP reaped approximately one percentage point in ROC aggregate vote shares in 2011 as a result of the change in the impact of this attitude. Had market liberalism mattered in 2011 to the same extent it did in 2008, the NDP would have ended up with one point less in the ballot boxes, to the benefit of the Liberals.
19 Since little about the NDP platform or its leader changed, there are two possible and complementary explanations. Voters perceived the Liberals under Michael Ignatieff as further right than under Stéphane Dion, or the ROC voters who moved to the NDP for other reasons were more left-leaning than those who stayed put. We expect both are true to some extent. This NDP gain on market liberalism, however, is balanced by a loss on political disaffection. In 2008, cynics tended to vote for New Democrats, while three years later they divided their votes between Liberals and the NDP. This swing in the impact of disaffection also resulted in a one-point gap, but to the advantage of the Liberal party. Bottom line: the dynamics in the effects of general orientations between 2008 and 2011 are not responsible for the NDP's growth in the rest of Canada. Table 5 shows that the distribution of ROC opinion moved significantly between the two elections in the case of four general orientations: accommodating Quebec, continentalism, moral traditionalism and regional alienation. Two of these movements could have aided the Conservatives; people became more favourable to close ties with the US and less critical of their province's treatment in the federation. Two changes might have helped the parties on the left; people became more open regarding Quebec and more liberal in social terms. Simulations that predict the 2011 electoral outcome had the attitudes not changed confirm the direction of these expectations. Overall, though, the simulations suggest that the NDP only garnered about one percentage point as a result of the shift in the distribution of opinions, particularly due to the rise in opposition to moral traditionalism, a political terrain which the party occupied very effectively in 2011.
In Quebec, the partisan landscape of general orientations changed dramatically over the last two elections~see Table 4 !. In 2008, the NDP clientele, small as it was~12%!, was distinctive on two fronts: more distant towards the US and less alienated regionally. Three years later, the NDP attracted more opponents to market liberalism and to moral conservatism, along with the politically disaffected and the alienated. In some ways, the NDP stole the Bloc's not fully sovereignist voters. In 2008, state interventionists, social liberals, cynics and the regionally alienated were relatively sympathetic to the BQ. In 2011, those voters inclined toward the NDP. 20 The only group that the Bloc retained in both elections was the one clearly in favour of sovereignty, and even there the Bloc lost ground~see below!. One new correlate of Bloc support also surfaced in 2011: negative views of continentalism. Did this transformation of the BQ and NDP vote structures happen during the inter-election period or during the 2011 campaign? Despite the fact that few differences in the fourth column of Table 4 are significant, the changes in relationships mostly took place during the course of the latest campaign. The determinants of Bloc and NDP vote intentions during the first portion of the 2011 campaign resemble to a great extent those of the 2008 vote choice. The relationships evolved during the campaign and ultimately reached the values of the reported effects on the 2011 vote choice. The lack of significant campaign differences in the table is due to the small sample size of each group in the Quebec campaign split.
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The attitudinal profiles of Conservative and Liberal voters were, in comparison with those of the NDP and Bloc, more stable over time. In both elections, Harper's party had greater success among federalists, continentalists, market liberals, moral traditionalists, non-cynics and nonalienated~only in 2011!. Each time, the Liberal voters' only distinctive characteristic was being opposed to sovereignty.
Did the Bloc fail in 2011 because Quebeckers turned against the sovereignty agenda? Support for sovereignty was significantly but only slightly less popular in 2011~40%! than in 2008~42%!. Though many electors ditched the Bloc in 2011, they nevertheless continued to endorse sovereignty. In fact, over a third of 2011 NDP supporters would like to see Quebec become a country~38%!. 22 Yet the key voters were in the middle. The NDP, like the Action Démocratique du Québec~ADQ! had been in 2007~Bélanger and Nadeau, 2009!, was more successful among moderates on both sides of the national issue. It attracted more people somewhat favourable to sovereignty than very favourable, and more people somewhat opposed to sovereignty than very opposed. Still, all four groups supported the NDP more in 2011 than in 2008. If the orange surge did not embody a rejection of Quebec sovereignty, it nonetheless signals the weakening of its power as the structuring dimension in federal electoral politics in Quebec. The fact that so many sovereignists were willing to vote for the federalist NDP indicates that the national question was no longer their overriding motivation.
Was the orange wave a form of protest? The level of political disaffection did not change outside Quebec between 2008 and 2011~ϩ.01!, while it did rise significantly in Quebec during that period~ϩ.08 on a scale ranging from Ϫ1 to ϩ1!~see Table 5 !. Although the increase in cynicism is not huge, it is there, and it occurred only in Quebec. Even among survey panelists interviewed in both years, the results are strikingly similar. The rise in political discontent in Quebec that we observe in the CES data corresponds well with what has been described by many as a climate of growing distrust in politics following two years of continuous public allegations of corruption in that province~see, for example, Bellavance, 2011; Noël, 2011 !. That climate may have laid the table for significant voter volatility in Quebec prior to the 2011 federal election. Politically distrustful voters are generally attracted to non-traditional party alternatives~see Bélanger, 2007: 97-101 !. Was it a factor behind the NDP wave in Quebec? Mean cynicism scores increased among all party groups in Quebec between 2008 and 2011, the largest shift however in cynicism~ϩ.14! is found among NDP voters~climbing from .12 to .27!. In addition, those Quebecers who defected from their 2008 party choice were more distrustful than those who remained loyal to their partỹ ϩ.06!. As well, new NDP voters in 2011 were slightly more cynical than NDP voters who had already supported this party three years earlier ϩ.05!. Simulations, however, indicate that the increase in political disaffection does not explain the orange surge; it only brought the NDP approximately one percentage point. The transformation of cynicism's relationships to vote choice is not much more decisive; the fact that the NDP stole this topic from the Bloc accounts for a two-point swing. Therefore, we cannot uncover definitive evidence that cynicism was the dominant motivation behind vote switching in favour of the New Democrats. All we can say is that Quebec voters in 2011 were embedded in an overall atmosphere of political alienation that favoured discontinuity.
Disaffection in Quebec may also have had something to do with a rejection of the other parties. Apart from the NDP, all parties' ther-mometer scores declined from 2008 to 2011 in the province. The Bloc's thermometer score decreased by 8 points on a 101-point scale, the Conservatives lost 5 points, and the Liberals fell by 4 points. 23 Were the NDP ranks a refuge for people disappointed by these political parties? Actually, all voters saw these parties in a less favourable light. The Conservative supporters in 2011 gave lower ratings to the Liberals and the Bloc compared to those of 2008. The evaluations of the Conservatives and the BQ dropped in the eyes of Liberal voters. And the Bloquistes adjusted downward their scores of Conservatives and Liberals. The key point is that NDP voters were not more likely to have diminished thermometer scores of the opposing parties. Also, those who switched to the NDP between 2008 and 2011 did not hold more negative assessments of other parties than all other voters. So, again, there are signs of growing political disenchantment surrounding the 2011 election in Quebec, but this context only loosened the partisan commitments of citizens, it did not necessarily lead them massively to the New Democrats.
Although no single general orientation appeared to have been a magic bullet, the orientations overall do constitute a large part of the story for the orange surge in Quebec. In 2008, the NDP captured only a few value dimensions among Quebeckers: opposition to closer ties with the US and regional satisfaction. In 2011, they managed to occupy a much wider span of the value spectrum in the province: mild opposition to sovereignty, market interventionism, social liberalism, political disaffection and regional alienation. Much of this territory was previously held by the Bloc. Citizens modified their opinions about some of these general orientations, but the dynamics in the attitudinal profiles resulted in a much greater pay-off electorally for New Democrats. Simulations show this clearly. If the relationships between general orientations and vote choice had not changed between 2008 and 2011, the NDP would have received as much as nine percentage points less in Quebec vote shares~close to a third of the orange wave!, while attitude change only brought the party about three points. 24 The success of the NDP in 2011 did indeed partially hinge on the party's capacity to rally many Quebec voters sharing these ideas. Numerous people became convinced that the NDP could be a good~or better! vehicle for these ideas.
Partisanship
The next block of variables to enter models in Tables 3 and 4 measures partisanship through a set of simple binary variables capturing strong or fairly strong identification with each of the major parties during the campaign wave, with non-identifiers as the residual category~see appendix!. Results suggest a good deal of stability in the size of the effects across elections, except in the case of the NDP. In the rest of Canada, NDP partisans were more likely to vote NDP in 2011 than in 2008. In Quebec, the effect declined in strength. The different patterns reflect a combination of the number of partisans, the pattern of their loyalty, and their proportion among a party's voters. The percentage of NDP partisans in the ROC stayed around 10 per cent, but they were more inclined to vote NDP in 2011~86%! than in 2008~80%!. In Quebec, while most NDP partisans cast a ballot for that party in both elections, the NDP's recent success extended way beyond its partisan core. While 35 per cent of NDP voters in 2008 were NDP partisans, this proportion fell to 17 per cent in 2011. The party managed to capture many Liberal partisans~31%!, Bloc partisans~30%!, and Conservative partisans~12%!.
Our focus so far has been on explaining the NDP surge, and we have emphasized the factors leading voters to desert the other parties. But now we must also emphasize that we detect very little evidence to suggest that the short-term shift to the NDP solidified quickly during and after the campaign in terms of partisanship. Figure 4 shows the distribution of post-election partisanship from 2004 to 2011 in Canada as a whole, using only those who say their attachment is "fairly" or "very" strong. 25 The Liberals have been in steady decline since 2006, the Conservatives on the ascent, and 2011 simply continued these trends. In the case of the Bloc, the shock of 2011 is indeed observed in partisan affil- 26 The party that experienced the largest vote swings in 2011, the NDP, moved up in party identifications from 9 to 14 per cent of Canadians and from 5 to 14 per cent in Quebec. Considering that New Democrats more than tripled their vote share in the province and ended up with 43 per cent of votes cast during the 2011 election, their number of identifiers rose somewhat modestly. These results demonstrate that party identification is not a simple reflection of vote choicẽ see also Gidengil et al., 2012; Green and Yoon, 2002 !. The Liberals still have as many partisans as the NDP. The BQ hangs on to a base from which to rebound. And the NDP has not yet built a solid core in Quebec.
How much stability in party identification was there from the campaign to the post-election in 2011? Measuring the stability of partisanship is fraught with measurement error~Green and Palmquist, 1990!. Undoubtedly, some survey respondents take the question to be about their most recent feelings rather than a long-term attachment. Nonetheless, we can observe patterns across parties in 2011 that tell us a good deal about how a party might fare going into the following election. Looking at loyalty of partisanship from the campaign-wave interview to the post-election interview, we observe that the Conservatives held on to the largest proportion of their identifiers~90%!. The NDP is next with 87 per cent partisan stability, while the Liberals and Bloc are down at 80 per cent and 77 per cent respectively. On the one hand, the differences indicate that the 2011 election shook the faith of a fair number of Liberal and Bloc partisans. On the other hand, the high proportions highlight the staying power of party identification. The Bloc saw more partisan evaporation between the campaign and the post-election because their partisans were much more likely to abandon their identification after supporting a different party in the voting booth in 2011. The BQ retained the attachments of only 30 per cent of its identifiers that voted for another party. The Conservatives, Liberals and NDP retained the same proportion of their partisans who strayed in the voting booth~60%!. Choosing another party shook the foundation of Bloc partisanship far more than it did for any of the other parties.
Economy and issues
The next two blocks are short-term factors: judgments about the recent evolution of the economy and views on public policy issues. Economic perceptions were infrequently and then only weakly related to vote choice. In the ROC~Table 3!, people with positive evaluations of the Canadian economy were slightly more prone to vote for the incumbent Conservatives in both elections. Those with negative economic views leaned toward the Liberals in 2008, but toward the NDP in 2011. Since the relationships are tiny in both cases, however, this swing was not beneficial for Layton's party~nil impact on vote shares!. Moreover, perceptions of the national economy improved significantly between the two elections. And this attitude change helped the Conservatives marginally to the detriment of New Democrats~one percentage point!. In Quebec~Table 4!, economic perceptions were not at all linked to NDP support in either year. Consequently, the two economic variables simply cannot be the main explanations for the upswing in NDP fortunes from 2008 to 2011.
Overall, issue positions were minor determinants of vote choice across the two regions in both elections. They were generally outshone by general orientations, party identification and leader evaluations~which we examine in the next section!. But changes both in the effects and the distributions of issues were observed between 2008 and 2011 in both regions. Thus, we have to consider the role of issues in the 2011 surprise outcome. In the rest of Canada, positions on four issues predicted Liberal support in 2008-personal taxes, spending on health, defence and the environment-while none did so in 2011. People who demanded extra spending on the environment tended to back the NDP during the last election. Also, one issue materialized as a relevant factor in 2011~cor-porate taxes, notably correlated to a NDP vote!, as another issue disappeared from the scene~spending on health!. According to simulations, these modifications of the vote structure account for a climb of two percentage points in NDP 2011 ROC shares. Additionally, significant shifts in the mean issue scores between the two elections are evident in Table 5 . ROC respondents became less favourable to increases in personal taxes, spending on defence, spending on the environment, and immigration. Only the second of these changes could have helped the NDP. In actuality, simulations show that the party would have done equally well had there been no movement in the distribution of the four issues.
While issues did not make a difference outside Quebec, they turn out to be critical elements of the orange surge story in that province. In comparison to 2008, three issues emerged as significantly associated with voting for the New Democrats in Quebec in 2011~Table 4!. People who favoured higher corporate taxes, more spending on the environment and more spending on health care were more likely to cast an NDP ballot. These gains were mostly made at the expense of the Bloc which, three years earlier, was attracting supporters of higher environmental and health expenditures~though the latter effect barely misses being significant!. Another way to put this is that the NDP carved off much of the ideological left of the Bloc, as we saw above for the market and social liberalism orientations. Because the distribution of views on the three topics was quite skewed in Quebec, the issues were very profitable for the NDP. Simulations report that if these three factors had mattered in 2011 the same way they did in 2008, the New Democrats would have obtained nine percentage points less in Quebec vote shares~about a third of the orange wave!. The opinions of Quebeckers regarding two issues evolved during this period~environment and immigration!, but simulations reveal this was of no consequence for the 2011 electoral outcome.
Leadership
The final block is composed of leader evaluations on a 101-point thermometer scale recoded to run from Ϫ1 to ϩ1~see appendix!. Unsurprisingly, these variables behave a lot like partisanship does: the more positive one's assessment of a party's leader, the greater the propensity to vote for that party. Inversely, an individual is less likely to mark a ballot in favour of that party when he or she likes the leader of another party. The impact of leader evaluations is substantial and rather consistent across elections, even for the Liberals who changed leaders. Nevertheless changes over time in both the opinions about the leaders and the effects of these opinions on voting preferences did occur and we need to consider whether the changes were driving forces behind the orange wave. Figure 5 displays the evolution of the mean ratings of party leaders during the campaign in both regions. It is clear that Jack Layton was perceived positively in 2011. In fact, he was the lonely leader on the positive side of the scale. He just edged out Stephen Harper in the ROC, but he floated high above other leaders in Quebec. Was Layton more popular in 2011 than in 2008? Outside Quebec, Layton's overall mean ratings in both years were essentially identical, though Harper's and the Liberal leaders' scores declined slightly but significantly~Table 5!. In Quebec, all leaders took a tumble except Layton, who was perceived more favourably. Furthermore, Layton's evaluations improved significantly over the course of the campaign in both regions, rising nearly 10 points between the first two weeks and the last two weeks. In the ROC, these campaign personal popularity gains coincide with the upward movement of NDP vote intentions~starting around April 17!. In Quebec, the first~April 3! and second~April 17! steps of the NDP climb took place when the evaluations of Layton became more positive. Visually, the party's performance therefore seems to improve at the same time the NDP leader was doing better. Are the movements in leader popularity large enough to explain the dramatic surge of NDP support? Simulations that compare predicted vote choice using the leaders' ratings at the beginning and the end of the 2011 campaign~holding everything else constant! suggest that the NDP harvested two percentage points in the ROC and six points in Quebec as a result of the growing gap in popularity between Jack Layton and his opponents. This is another important part of the story of the 2011 election. There are other signs that leadership played a prominent role in the 2011 voting calculus as well, particularly in Quebec. Asking respondents about the main reason they voted the way they did produces a wide range of responses, of course~see Table 6 !, but a disproportionate number of NDP voters in Quebec name Jack Layton as the top reason~36%!. This proportion is larger than for any other party, in either region. And while scholars are rightfully hesitant to rely on respondents' own analyses of their behaviour, on this point the regression models in Tables 3 and 4 support voters' assessments. The impact of Layton's ratings on 2011 NDP support in Quebec was the largest observed during the two elections among any party. It should be noted that this shift in the weight of leadership did not occur during the interlude period between the two elections. Regression models conducted on campaign vote intentions indicate that the effect of Layton's evaluations on NDP voting in Quebec increased during the 2011 campaign, not before. Some movement along these lines is also present in the ROC, but on a much smaller scale. According to simulations, because of the change in the effects of Layton's ratings, the NDP ended up with an extra two points in the ROC and three points in Quebec. Of course, we cannot argue with certainty that people chose to modify the weights they allocated to leadership considerations. They could also have switched preferences for other reasons and this would have influenced the relationships of leader evaluations.
Further analysis aimed at distinguishing voters who switched to the NDP from those who stayed with their 2008 party confirm that favourable impressions of Jack Layton in 2011 powerfully drove 2008 support- 
Conclusion
Why did the NDP make a significant breakthrough~at least in Quebec! during the 2011 federal election? Our analysis of data from the 2011 Canadian Election Study as well as news media content reveals which explanations withstand empirical scrutiny. Neither fluke polls, leaders' debates, nor a decline in support for Quebec sovereignty were the driving forces behind the orange wave. Instead, the surge was the result of a set of forces driving supporters of all the other political parties toward the NDP: a combination of Jack Layton's leadership and the discovery by many voters of the NDP's proximity on some values and issues. First, multiple sources of evidence indicate that positive ratings of Jack Layton were vital for the NDP victory in Quebec. The leader of the New Democrats gained popularity both between the two most recent elections and over the course of the 2011 campaign. At the aggregate level, NDP support rose in tandem with an expanding gap between Layton and other leaders during the campaign. Key events in Quebec, such as Layton's appearance on the province's main talk show early in the campaign and a change in the Bloc Québécois' campaign strategy, likely contributed. At the individual level, evaluations of Layton dominated other variables in comprehensive vote choice models. These evaluations even gathered strength in explaining vote choice over the campaign. Likewise, a substantial number of NDP voters in Quebec cited leadership qualities as the most relevant motivation for their final choice. And voters who switched to the NDP in 2011 had particular leadership assessments.
Second, the NDP managed to occupy some valuable ideological territory and convince Quebeckers of their credibility in the centre-left of the spectrum. Cutting across the main cleavage in Quebec politics, the party attracted both soft sovereignists and soft federalists. It was also able to credibly embody values traditionally owned by the Bloc in Que-bec: state interventionism, moral liberalism, political disaffection and regional alienation. Their territory was broader than this, however, as the NDP was also successful in conquering centrist and right-of-centre Liberals and Conservatives on the dimension of market liberalism.
Relatedly, questions on budgetary policy reveal three domains that were cornerstones of the orange surge. Voting for the New Democrats in Quebec in 2011 was related to support for increased spending on health care, more spending on the environment, and higher corporate taxes. Again, many of these gains were made at the expense of the Bloc Québé-cois, which had attracted during the previous election numerous individuals sharing these positions.
Interestingly, the more modest advances of the NDP outside Quebec were also connected to this trio of factors: values, issues and leadership. The ROC electorate moved slightly to the left on the topic of social liberalism. The party took hold of the clientele for two relevant issue positions: more spending on the environment and higher corporate taxes. Opinions of Jack Layton became more favourable relative to other leaders and also more pertinent for vote choice.
Our conclusions do not stem from a simple analysis of the correlates of vote choice in 2011. Rather, they come from models and simulations designed to identify differences over time; specifically differences in the distribution of opinion and differences in the effects of variables, either across two elections~2008 and 2011! or during the 2011 campaign. We believe this is the most appropriate strategy to account for changes in the electoral fortunes of political parties.
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Earthquakes of the magnitude that shook the foundations of the Canadian party system in 2011 do not occur frequently. One could argue that the leadership and platform of the NDP have changed little in the last few elections, yet only in 2011 was there a major breakthrough. Why did the orange surge take place then? Our results highlight which types of individuals were more likely to change their mind and vote differently, but they do not provide evidence of causality nor of the fundamental reasons why voters switched preferences. Only speculation is possible. Perhaps part of the story lies with growing political disaffection and cynicism in Quebec following years of allegations of political corruption at the municipal and provincial levels. These sentiments did not directly lead citizens toward the New Democrats, but they created space for weakened partisan ties and thus electoral volatility. In so doing, they may have indirectly contributed to the success of the NDP in the province. The coincidence of a few campaigning coups with a sequence of polling successes could have played a role as well, by creating momentum and raising the electoral expectations for the party. A strategic blunder probably also mattered. The decision of Bloc leaders partway through the campaign to focus on Quebec sovereignty rather than their usual mantra- What do these results imply for the future fortunes of the NDP, especially in Quebec? Of course, one of the main draws of the party in 2011, Jack Layton, has passed away, and his loss may be devastating for the party. The selection of Thomas Mulcair as NDP leader could lessen the blow, at least in Quebec where he is very popular among citizens of all political stripes. It remains true, however, that New Democrats are faced with holding together a Quebec rainbow coalition composed notably of sovereignists and federalists, along with both left-and right-leaning voters. As other parties who suddenly find themselves supported by contrasting clienteles often discover, the NDP will be forced into a delicate balancing act. Pleasing all sides of the "question nationale" is invariably troublesome, particularly when the party has to deal with sustaining its appeal in English Canada as well. And since the NDP's support has not yet crystallized as genuine partisan attachment in Quebec, their task will be challenging indeed.
The significant shift of Quebec's voting preferences in the 2011 election may thus mark a paradigmatic change in the Canadian electoral landscape, or it may reflect a perfect but fleeting electoral storm. This article has attempted to identify the combination of both long-and short-term factors behind this unexpected outcome. As for the durability of the resulting change, however, only time will tell. The NDP surge during, not before, the 2011 campaign, suggests that we will have to wait for the next general election to answer this question
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To view supplementary material for this article, please visit: http:00 dx.doi.org0S0008423913000875 we use the following weights: tϭ5, t-1ϭ4, t-2ϭ3, t-3ϭ2, t-4ϭ1. For Quebec, we smooth somewhat more due to a smaller sample size: tϭ5, t-1ϭ4, t-2ϭ4, t-3ϭ3, t-4ϭ3. Media data in Figures 2 and 3 also rely on five-day weighted averages, as follows: tϭ5, t-1ϭ4, t-2ϭ3, t-3ϭ2, t-4ϭ1. Note that smoothing gives more weight to current and most recent days, so as to properly capture the timing of shifts. In all cases, weighting was based on the need to both take advantage of cases across multiple days~to get more accurate estimates!, and to smooth data series to make charts more legible. 3 The 2011 CES was fielded by the Institute for Social Research at York University, under the supervision of David Northrup. The campaign response rate was 41 per cent. The RDD sample is only weighted based on provincial population estimates and the number of household members. Questionnaires, data and technical documentation can be obtained from ces-eec.org. 4 The 2008 reported vote was captured during the 2011 campaign wave, while the 2011 reported vote was measured during the 2011 post-election wave. Despite the fact that the first question refers to an event which took place over two-and-a-half years earlier, the distribution of responses resembles the official results of that electoral contest. The following numbers can be compared to those in the final row of Table 1 Lexicoder is a Java-based content analysis utility freely available for academic use at lexicoder.com. 8 We were very careful to use an appropriate smoothing strategy before making this determination. We verified that our rolling-window smoother produced a very similar tracking of vote intentions as other smoothing methods. The most technically sound, a state-space~Kalman! filter, with subsequent smoothing, as recommended by Green and Yoon~2002!, produces a tracking almost identical to our simpler version depicted in Figure 1 . 9 It is possible that reaching first place in Quebec vote intention polls helped the NDP make even more gains among the electorate, for instance, by affecting expectations about the final electoral outcome. But we cannot examine this issue; a separate dedicated study would be required. 10 The NDP vote share in the ROC seems to be moving upwards as of April 17, but it seems unlikely that this can be credited to the April 12 debate, since the NDP vote share was totally flat through the debate period. 11 The keywords used here are referendum, référendum, sovereignty, séparation, souveraineté, souverain, and souverainiste, along with the names of the three party leaders and activists most active in talking about these issues in the news: Pauline Marois, Jacques Parizeau and Gérald Larose. Both the Quebec newspapers and the entire set show exactly the same story. 12 The cases with missing data were excluded listwise. To minimize the number of exclusions, we avoided variables with too many missing cases~such as those originating from the mailback and web waves, along with income, which always elicits a great number of refusals!. 13 For instance, in the 2011 Quebec NDP final model containing all blocks, voting for that party remains significantly related to university education, Quebec sovereignty, political disaffection, NDP partisanship, health spending, environment spending, Harper ratings and Layton evaluations, but other variables are washed out by the additional controls. 14 To avoid overloading the table, the campaign marginal effects are not reported; only the significance in gaps between campaign marginal effects is presented. The full results are available from the authors upon request.
